Research
The Role of Loan Market Access and Financial Covenants in Pricing Private Placements
(with Ca Nguyen)
Forthcoming at Journal of Corporate Finance (2023)
Our study examines the pricing of private placements for issuing firms with outstanding loan covenants. Using Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPE) deals in 2001-2018, we find that issuing firms restricted by loan covenants offer a discount of 3.9% larger than those without covenants. The positive effect of financial covenants on discount is validated by channel tests regarding covenant violation history, different measures of covenant strictness, PIPE lead investor identity, and PIPE governance-related provisions. A greater likelihood of technical default and costly renegotiation in covenants potentially incentivizes borrowing firms to switch from the loan market to the PIPEs market. To minimize endogeneity concerns, we use a matched sample, Heckman selection model, and two-stage least squares instrumental variable analysis, and find consistent results. Our findings suggest that, rather than free riding on the monitoring efforts by loan creditors, PIPE investors are more concerned about the risk of transferring control rights to lenders, prompting them to demand for deeper discount at PIPE issuance.
Shareholder Litigation and Short Selling Ahead of Private Equity Placements
(with Onur Bayar and Juan Mao)
The Financial Review (2023)
We examine the impact of shareholder litigation on short selling ahead of PIPEs. We find that PIPE issuers that incurred securities class action lawsuits prior to the PIPE are shorted more heavily ahead of the PIPE issue. The case status at the PIPE date, the severity of the lawsuit, and the timing of the private placement after the litigation event also affect the extent of short selling activity ahead of PIPEs. Consistent with hedging incentives, the effects of prior shareholder litigation on short selling are more pronounced in PIPEs where lead investors are hedge funds and in traditional PIPEs.
Does innovation success reduce the cost of financing? Evidence from private investments in public equity
Finance Research Letters (2023): 103378.
This paper investigates the relation between a firm’s innovation performance and the cost of financing in private investments in public equity (PIPEs). Using patent-based metric data, I find that innovative firms issue securities in private equity placements at a 5.4% lower discount than
non-innovative firms. The negative effect of innovation performance on PIPE discounts is more pronounced for firms in R&D intensive industries and firms with higher stock market illiquidity. Channel tests show that innovative firms are more likely to be led by strategic investors who are
willing to pay a higher price to support innovative issuers. The results are robust to alternative methods that mitigate endogeneity issues.
How Reverse Merger Firms Raise Capital in PIPEs: Search Costs and Placement Agent Reputation
(with Onur Bayar and Juan Mao)
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 56.1 (2021), 143-184.
We examine the role of placement agents in private investments in public equity (PIPE) deals of firms that went public via a reverse merger (RM). We find that reputable placement agents with greater expertise (expert agents) help RM firms to complete their PIPE deals in a smaller number of financing rounds (closings) and raise funds from a larger base of private investors. However, RM firms advised by expert agents agree to more investor-friendly contract terms and pay higher cash compensation to their placement agents. Further, RM firms are not able to negotiate more attractive pricing when they agree to more investor-friendly contract terms in PIPEs placed by expert agents. Overall, our evidence indicates that, while expert PIPE agents use their superior networking capabilities to reduce the search costs of RM firms, they also exercise more bargaining power against RM firms compared to non-expert PIPE agents. Finally, compared to the PIPE offerings of IPO firms, the PIPE offerings of RM firms are more likely to involve deals with multiple closings and substantially larger offer price discounts. This suggests that raising new capital in PIPEs entails significantly higher costs for RM firms than IPO firms.
Litigation and Information Effects on Private Sales of Securities
(with Onur Bayar, Ioannis V. Floros, and Juan Mao)
(presented at 2019 Financial Management Association meetings, 2021 Eastern Finance Association meetings, 2021 FMA Europe Conference)
We analyze the resolution of information asymmetry in transactions of private investments in public equity (PIPEs) in which the issuer has experienced class action lawsuits. We explain the associated wealth and pricing effects (information effects). We show that litigated PIPEs are associated with higher announcement wealth effects and lower levels of discounts than non-litigated PIPEs. We find that disclosure, prior investors' ownership, early registration, and intermediation have positive information effects on incumbent and new investors when issuers concurrently pursue the desired corporate actions (proxied by the auditor changes). We conclude that PIPE issuers can mitigate information effects from prior litigation.
Note: The hand collection process of allegation types and attributes of the securities class action lawsuits in our sample is described here. The dataset is password protected on the data page (available upon request).
The data fields description is available here.
The Role of Existing Shareholders in Private Equity Placements: Evidence from PIPEs in China
(with Di Lu and Suhua Tian)
Forthcoming at The Journal of Financial Research (2024)
This paper investigates how the participation of firms’ existing shareholders affects the pricing and valuation of private investments in public equity (PIPEs). Using a large sample of PIPEs issued by Chinese listed firms from 2006 to 2019, we find that the effective discount and long-term buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns of PIPEs participated by existing shareholders are significantly higher than those participated only by new investors, after controlling heterogeneous types of PIPE investors. However, the superior post-PIPE stock performance of deals with existing shareholders is not driven by improved operating performance but tunneling activities such as frequent dividend announcements, related-party transactions, and positive earnings management during the lock-up period. Our findings suggest that the effect of existing shareholders presence in private equity placements is more consistent with the “Tunneling Hypothesis” than the “Certification Hypothesis”. We document that the tunneling incentives are stronger when firms face greater financial constraints and can be mitigated when the firm's corporate governance is stronger.
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Informativeness
(with Onur Bayar, Fariz Huseynov and Sabuhi Sardarli)
We show that private information incorporated by outside investors into stock price has an economically significant effect on the sensitivity of corporate tax avoidance to stock price. Corporate tax avoidance is much more sensitive to stock price when the price contains new information to managers. This effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for various sources of public and managerial private information and is stronger in firms with higher capital intensity and foreign operations. Overall, the results suggest that managers learn from the private information in stock prices and incorporate this information into their corporate tax avoidance decisions.
Coauthored Book: "Equity Markets, Valuation, and Analysis"
Chapter 14: "Private Company Valuation"
The Role of Loan Market Access and Financial Covenants in Pricing Private Placements
(with Ca Nguyen)
Forthcoming at Journal of Corporate Finance (2023)
Our study examines the pricing of private placements for issuing firms with outstanding loan covenants. Using Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPE) deals in 2001-2018, we find that issuing firms restricted by loan covenants offer a discount of 3.9% larger than those without covenants. The positive effect of financial covenants on discount is validated by channel tests regarding covenant violation history, different measures of covenant strictness, PIPE lead investor identity, and PIPE governance-related provisions. A greater likelihood of technical default and costly renegotiation in covenants potentially incentivizes borrowing firms to switch from the loan market to the PIPEs market. To minimize endogeneity concerns, we use a matched sample, Heckman selection model, and two-stage least squares instrumental variable analysis, and find consistent results. Our findings suggest that, rather than free riding on the monitoring efforts by loan creditors, PIPE investors are more concerned about the risk of transferring control rights to lenders, prompting them to demand for deeper discount at PIPE issuance.
Shareholder Litigation and Short Selling Ahead of Private Equity Placements
(with Onur Bayar and Juan Mao)
The Financial Review (2023)
We examine the impact of shareholder litigation on short selling ahead of PIPEs. We find that PIPE issuers that incurred securities class action lawsuits prior to the PIPE are shorted more heavily ahead of the PIPE issue. The case status at the PIPE date, the severity of the lawsuit, and the timing of the private placement after the litigation event also affect the extent of short selling activity ahead of PIPEs. Consistent with hedging incentives, the effects of prior shareholder litigation on short selling are more pronounced in PIPEs where lead investors are hedge funds and in traditional PIPEs.
Does innovation success reduce the cost of financing? Evidence from private investments in public equity
Finance Research Letters (2023): 103378.
This paper investigates the relation between a firm’s innovation performance and the cost of financing in private investments in public equity (PIPEs). Using patent-based metric data, I find that innovative firms issue securities in private equity placements at a 5.4% lower discount than
non-innovative firms. The negative effect of innovation performance on PIPE discounts is more pronounced for firms in R&D intensive industries and firms with higher stock market illiquidity. Channel tests show that innovative firms are more likely to be led by strategic investors who are
willing to pay a higher price to support innovative issuers. The results are robust to alternative methods that mitigate endogeneity issues.
How Reverse Merger Firms Raise Capital in PIPEs: Search Costs and Placement Agent Reputation
(with Onur Bayar and Juan Mao)
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 56.1 (2021), 143-184.
We examine the role of placement agents in private investments in public equity (PIPE) deals of firms that went public via a reverse merger (RM). We find that reputable placement agents with greater expertise (expert agents) help RM firms to complete their PIPE deals in a smaller number of financing rounds (closings) and raise funds from a larger base of private investors. However, RM firms advised by expert agents agree to more investor-friendly contract terms and pay higher cash compensation to their placement agents. Further, RM firms are not able to negotiate more attractive pricing when they agree to more investor-friendly contract terms in PIPEs placed by expert agents. Overall, our evidence indicates that, while expert PIPE agents use their superior networking capabilities to reduce the search costs of RM firms, they also exercise more bargaining power against RM firms compared to non-expert PIPE agents. Finally, compared to the PIPE offerings of IPO firms, the PIPE offerings of RM firms are more likely to involve deals with multiple closings and substantially larger offer price discounts. This suggests that raising new capital in PIPEs entails significantly higher costs for RM firms than IPO firms.
Litigation and Information Effects on Private Sales of Securities
(with Onur Bayar, Ioannis V. Floros, and Juan Mao)
(presented at 2019 Financial Management Association meetings, 2021 Eastern Finance Association meetings, 2021 FMA Europe Conference)
We analyze the resolution of information asymmetry in transactions of private investments in public equity (PIPEs) in which the issuer has experienced class action lawsuits. We explain the associated wealth and pricing effects (information effects). We show that litigated PIPEs are associated with higher announcement wealth effects and lower levels of discounts than non-litigated PIPEs. We find that disclosure, prior investors' ownership, early registration, and intermediation have positive information effects on incumbent and new investors when issuers concurrently pursue the desired corporate actions (proxied by the auditor changes). We conclude that PIPE issuers can mitigate information effects from prior litigation.
Note: The hand collection process of allegation types and attributes of the securities class action lawsuits in our sample is described here. The dataset is password protected on the data page (available upon request).
The data fields description is available here.
The Role of Existing Shareholders in Private Equity Placements: Evidence from PIPEs in China
(with Di Lu and Suhua Tian)
Forthcoming at The Journal of Financial Research (2024)
This paper investigates how the participation of firms’ existing shareholders affects the pricing and valuation of private investments in public equity (PIPEs). Using a large sample of PIPEs issued by Chinese listed firms from 2006 to 2019, we find that the effective discount and long-term buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns of PIPEs participated by existing shareholders are significantly higher than those participated only by new investors, after controlling heterogeneous types of PIPE investors. However, the superior post-PIPE stock performance of deals with existing shareholders is not driven by improved operating performance but tunneling activities such as frequent dividend announcements, related-party transactions, and positive earnings management during the lock-up period. Our findings suggest that the effect of existing shareholders presence in private equity placements is more consistent with the “Tunneling Hypothesis” than the “Certification Hypothesis”. We document that the tunneling incentives are stronger when firms face greater financial constraints and can be mitigated when the firm's corporate governance is stronger.
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Informativeness
(with Onur Bayar, Fariz Huseynov and Sabuhi Sardarli)
We show that private information incorporated by outside investors into stock price has an economically significant effect on the sensitivity of corporate tax avoidance to stock price. Corporate tax avoidance is much more sensitive to stock price when the price contains new information to managers. This effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for various sources of public and managerial private information and is stronger in firms with higher capital intensity and foreign operations. Overall, the results suggest that managers learn from the private information in stock prices and incorporate this information into their corporate tax avoidance decisions.
Coauthored Book: "Equity Markets, Valuation, and Analysis"
Chapter 14: "Private Company Valuation"